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Abstract 
This study examined the relationship between the need for cognition and impression 
formation, particularly with common biases. Upon listening to a speaker with either a 
heavy Japanese or Los Angeles accent, participants rated the speaker on how well-
informed they believed she appeared to be on the subject she spoke about and on 
intelligence. Despite the need for cognition, speakers with a Los Angeles accent were 
rated less favorably on intelligence, compared to Japanese accented speakers. However, 
the high need for cognition participants utilized a stereotype in impression formation, as 
their ratings for both speakers resonated with the speaker’s respective stereotype. 
Contrary to previous research findings, this study suggests that high need for cognition 
individuals are actually not protected from common biases, and these biases affect people 
of varying levels of need for cognition in different ways.
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The Need For Cognition 
 Social cognition research has shed light onto the notion that individuals differ in 
their tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thinking, a construct coined as need for 
cognition by Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955). It is widely believed that this 
phenomenon serves as the underlying mechanism that dictates peoples’ acquisition and 
use of information. Need for cognition (NFC) is believed to be a measurable 
characteristic, as NFC scales are commonly used for assessment. Individuals classified as 
“high NFC” are those who derive enjoyment from cognitively effortful tasks. 
Consequently, these people not only exert more effort onto these cognitively effortful 
tasks, but are more likely to engage in them as well (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol Horcajo, & 
Strathman, 2008). On the other hand, those who fall into the “low NFC” criteria exhibit 
opposite tendencies. 
The Need For Cognition on Impression Formation Theories  
 As theories of judgment in social psychology gained acknowledgement, NFC 
began to be utilized as a means to assess how people develop judgments based on 
impressions. In the context of theories of impression formation, a significant amount of 
research has led to the implication that individuals who are low in NFC are more likely to 
rely on stereotypes to form impressions on people—and even groups (Petty, Briñol, 
Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). In fact, it has been noted that total scores on the NFC Scale 
are negatively correlated with those on the Modern Racism Scale (Crawford & 
Skowronski, 1998). This is thought to be due to low-NFC peoples’ tendency to not 
engage in effortful thinking of the individual, which ultimately leads to a failure to 
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individuate the person(s) in light of the lack of detail cognitively acquired. On the 
contrary, research has also supported that high-NFC people are often times “protected” 
from typical impression formation biases, seeing that they are readily able to retain and 
utilize more cognitive information, instead of merely relying on common biases (Petty, et 
al., 2009). These two notions resonate well with each other, as their logic is consistent 
with one another.  
 However, in contrast to much of the research supporting that high-NFC 
individuals are protected from common biases, another line of research has suggested that 
their motivated thought can actually exacerbate a bias (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998). 
Though this seemingly contradicts former research, it actually signifies that common 
biases (i.e., stereotypes) affect people with different levels of NFC in different ways. 
Petty et al. (2008) attributed these findings to the following:  
1. Constructs are readily activated in high-NFC people, as opposed to low-NFC 
people. 
2. Seeing that high-NFC individuals engage in more thought, there are simply more 
available thoughts to be biased (i.e., more opportunities are present) 
3. High-NFC people tend to be more susceptible to priming effects, compared to 
their counterparts.  
Thus, the purpose of this study was to assess how individuals, of varying levels of 
need for cognition, would rate a female speaker, who spoke with either a heavy Los 
Angeles or heavy Japanese accent, on both how well-informed she was on the subject she 
spoke about and intelligence. Due to the abundance of research supporting this notion, I 
predicted that if subjects were to score lower on a NFC test, then they would rate the 
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woman with a heavy Japanese accent as more intelligent and more well-informed, 
compared to subjects who scored higher on a NFC test. As investigated by Maykovich 
(1971), common stereotypes of Japanese people include the view that they are very 
intelligent and industrious. Therefore, I hypothesized that low-NFC individuals would 
fall victim to the utilization of this bias when rating the speaker.  
Participants 
 Participants in this study consisted of 42 University of San Francisco (USF) 
students in an introductory psychology course. Due to the gender-ratio of psychology 
students at USF, it is important to note there were only three male participants (Table 1). 
The majority of the subjects were between the ages of 18 and 21, with the exception of 
two whom were 22 and 30 years of age (Table 2). The participants in this study received 
partial credit towards the fulfillment of their introductory psychology course requirement. 
Seeing that this was designed as a 2 (accent: Japanese vs. Los Angeles) x 2 (need for 
cognition: low vs. high) experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the accent 
condition. Upon completing the need for cognition test, subjects were also assigned to 
their adequate NFC condition based on their scores.  
Materials and Procedure  
The survey administered to the participants was comprised of many questions 
regarding different elements about the speaker they had heard. Only elements relevant to 
my hypothesis were assessed. First, subjects completed a nine-point scale, 18-question 
need for cognition scale (α = .83); the scale administered to subjects was a slightly 
amended version of the scale Petty and Cacioppo (1982) used in their study. Following 
the experiment, items on the scale were recoded so that higher scores on the scale 
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correspond to high NFC and vice versa. Fourteen participants were determined to be high 
NFC, while 13 were low NFC. These were the result of a median split completed on these 
scores. 
After completion of the NFC scale, participants were purposefully misled to 
believe they would each be assigned a random audio clip to listen to, which ranged a 
variety of topics. In reality, there were only two audio clips and one topic discussed: a 
description of a student’s favorite city. The aspect that did vary between the participants, 
though, was whether the speaker spoke with a heavy Japanese or Los Angeles accent. 
Even so, the speaker for both audio clips was the same person and the passages recited 
were identical. Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to the Los Angeles accent 
condition, while 11 were assigned to the Japanese accent condition. 
Following the audio clip, subjects answered a variety of questions regarding the 
speaker; most importantly, they judged how intelligent the speaker seemed to them, and 
how well-informed the speaker seemed about the subject she spoke. The response scale 
for both items ranged from zero to nine, with nine reflecting that participants felt either 
the speaker was very intelligent or very well-informed on the subject spoken about, and 
zero reflecting the opposite. It is important to note that several manipulation checks were 
present in order to ensure that the participants were fully attentive throughout the study. 
Ratings of the speaker’s intelligence and how well-informed she seemed on the subject 
she spoke about were assessed in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the two 
levels of the accent condition (Los Angeles vs. Japanese) and two levels of NFC 
condition (low-NFC vs. high-NFC) 
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Results for Ratings of Intelligence  
Accent type. A significant main effect was found for ratings of intelligence on 
type of accent, F (1,27) = 13.55, p = .001. Regardless of NFC, the speaker with a Los 
Angeles accent was rated much lower (m = 3.47; se = .48) in contrast to the speaker with 
a Japanese accent (m = 6.38; se = .63) on intelligence.  
Need for cognition. Results demonstrated a non-significant main effect for 
intelligence ratings on NFC, F (1,27) = 2.47, p = .13. Excluding accent type, low-NFC 
subjects rated the speaker on the basis of intelligence similarly to their counterparts (m = 
4.30, 5.54; se = .61, .50) 
Need for cognition x Accent type. The two-way ANOVA yielded a marginally 
significant main effect for the intelligence ratings interaction between NFC by accent 
type, F (1,27) = 3.64, p = .07. Interestingly, the average rating for the Japanese speaker 
was significantly higher for high-NFC individuals (m = 7.75; se = .66) compared to low-
NFC individuals (m = 5.00; se = 1.07). On the other hand, both low- and high-NFC 
participants rated the Los Angeles accented speaker similarly (m = 3.60, 3.33; se = .59, 
.76). Figure one, located in the appendix, exhibits these findings.  
Results for Ratings of Well-informed 
 Accent type. A main effect for participants’ ratings of how well informed the 
speaker appeared on accent type yielded an F ratio of F (1,27) = .648, p = .429, proving 
to be non-significant.  
 Need for cognition. As with ratings of intelligence, a non-significant main effect 
occurred for well-informed ratings on NFC, F (1,27) = 1.10, p = .31. Omitting type of 
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accent condition, low-NFC subjects did not differ significantly on their ratings (m = 5.80; 
se = .53) in comparison to high-NFC subjects (m = 6.52; se = .44). 
 Need for cognition x Accent type. A significant two-way interaction between NFC 
by accent type for well-informed ratings was present, F (1,27) = 9.80, p = .005. 
Following suit to the previous two-way interaction, high-NFC individuals evaluated the 
Japanese accented speaker more favorably on how well-informed she seemed regarding 
the subject she spoke (m = 7.88; se = .57) as opposed to low-NFC individuals’ ratings (m 
= 5.00; se = .93). Upon assessing the Los Angeles accented speaker on how well-
informed she seemed, however, low- and high-NFC subjects rated her analogously (m = 
6.60, 5.17; se = .51, .66). Figure two demonstrates these results.  
Discussion  
 Although the results did not provide support for my initial hypothesis, they were 
nonetheless sound and consistent with former empirical findings. First, a discrepancy was 
noted in the speakers’ intelligence ratings between accent type conditions, without 
considering NFC. The Japanese accented speaker was rated significantly higher on 
intelligence (m = 6.38; se = .63) when compared the Los Angeles accented speaker (m = 
3.47; se = .48). This implies that subjects fell victim to utilizing the common stereotype 
when judging the speaker that Japanese people are very intelligent. It could also infer that 
subjects fell victim to the contrary common stereotype that people with a heavy Los 
Angeles accent are generally “stupid” (Goodine and Johns, 2014).  
 However, when evaluating the Japanese speaker, high-NFC subjects rated the 
speaker much more favorably on intelligence (m = 7.75) and how well-informed she 
appeared to be (m = 7.88) compared to low-NFC subjects’ ratings of intelligence (m = 
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5.00) and well-informed (m = 5.00). The Los Angeles accented speaker’s ratings 
exhibited no major difference by NFC. Though these findings are directly opposite to 
what I hypothesized, the implications are clear: for both Los Angeles and Japanese 
accented speakers, high-NFC individuals are relying on the respective stereotype when 
forming judgments.  
 The (little) research supporting my findings attributes high-NFC individuals’ 
susceptibility to and protection from common biases to priming effects. It is believed that 
high-NFC individuals have a lower threshold for the activation of primes due to their 
tendency to engage in effortful thinking (Petty, et al., 2008). Therefore, high-NFC 
individuals respond more readily to priming effects. Without initially realizing it, the 
subjects were all subjected to a biasing agent. Subjects in the Los Angeles accent 
condition were primed to consider the speakers’ identity by listening to a heavy Los 
Angeles accent. This priming induction serves as a biasing agent which predisposes 
subjects to think about the speaker in relation to her Los Angeles identity, seeing that the 
accented speech was hyperbolic. Likewise, subjects in the Japanese accent condition 
encountered a similar biasing agent; however, it related to the Japanese accented 
speaker’s identity instead. It could very well be the case that high-NFC people simply 
had a greater cognitive capacity and greater tendency to engage in cognition, which 
enabled them to simply remember the speaker’s accent in relation to her identity more so 
than low-NFC subjects. Thus, explaining why high-NFC subjects utilized the respective 
stereotype more than low-NFC subjects.  
In general, if a biasing agent is blatant, people are likely to correct for it; that is, if 
people are primed with a biasing agent that is very apparent, they are more likely to 
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realize that the source of their judgment of the construct is due to the priming induction 
rather than their personal reaction (Petty, et al., 2008). On the other hand, people have a 
harder time correcting for biasing agents that are subtle. Given this logic, it would be 
sound to assume that high-NFC people would be able to correct the biasing agent in the 
study, especially since it was very hyperbolic (i.e., blatant). However, they failed to 
correct the bias. Nonetheless, this does explain why previous research has supported the 
notion that high-NFC people are protected from common biases.  
I believe the failure to correct the bias occurred because the subjects were given a 
plethora of seemingly random questions to answer about the speaker. The questions 
varied in nature, making it hard to connect them all to one construct. Ergo, the 
participants were greatly distracted to the point that I believe they overlooked the blatant 
priming biases. If they were merely given my two questions to answer on speaker 
intelligence and how well-informed she seemed, I believe high-NFC individuals would 
have been more likely to correct for the bias since answering only two questions is a lot 
less distracting. 
In line with this, research findings have also suggested correction effects for 
biasing agents and primes are most likely to occur when the content is clear and 
unambiguous (Petty, et al., 2008). Though the passage recited by the speaker was 
descriptive, the information given was still vague and ambiguous.  The speaker could 
have virtually been describing any major city in the world because the passage never 
once mentioned anything to denote the specific city. Thus, I also believe that due to the 
lack of detailed information given by the speaker, high-NFC subjects were able to more 
readily use the given biasing agent (i.e., speaker’s accent) to form an impression about 
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the speaker. Low-NFC subjects, on the other hand, failed to do this because this 
connection takes cognitive effort. High-NFC subjects’ motivated thought led them to 
form a biased judgment of the speaker. If the content of the passage recited gave more 
specific information as to the speaker’s identity, I believe high-NFC subjects would not 
have needed to rely on the bias to judge the speaker.  
This study demonstrates that high-NFC individuals are susceptible to biased 
judgments, much like their counterparts. Different contributing factors, however, 
determine this effect. One factor noted is the saliency of a priming effect (e.g., biasing 
agent). Though this correctional effect was not exhibited in this study, blatant priming 
effects are more likely to be corrected, especially by high-NFC individuals. A further 
study could perhaps examine saliency of the priming effect as a separate independent 
variable, and see how directly manipulating its saliency may affect judgment ratings. 
Another factor noted is the ambiguity of the target. Targets that are unambiguous and 
clear leave less room for biased cues to be needed in impression formation. The reason 
being that if information is clearer, then fewer assumptions have to be made. Another 
further study could also include ambiguity of the target as an independent variable to 
assess the extent of this effect. As this study demonstrated, thoughtfully motivated people 
ironically exhibit a bias in their impression formation, just as much (if not more) than 
their counterparts.  
  
Can Motivated Cognition Exacerbate a Bias? 12
Appendix  
Table 1. Participant Gender 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male 3 7.1 7.1 
Female  39 92.9 100.0 
Total 42 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 2. Participant Age 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
18 13 31.0 31.0 
19 20 47.6 78.6 
20 3 7.1 85.7 
21 4 9.5 95.2 
22 1 2.4 97.6 
30 1 2.4 100.0 
Total 42 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 3. Between-Subjects Factors 
Condition: N 
Los Angeles Accent 16 
Japanese Accent 11 
Low-NFC 13 
High-NFC 14 
Table 3. Two-way Interaction Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
Accent Type
How intelligent 
does the speaker 
seem to you? 
Los Angeles
Japanese 
How well-
informed does the 
speaker seem on 
the subject she has 
spoke about? 
Los Angeles
Japanese
 
Figure 1. Average intelligence ratings by accent type and NFC
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 NFC Mean
 Low-NFC 3.60
High-NFC 3.33
 Low-NFC 5.00
High-NFC 7.75
 Low-NFC 6.60
High-NFC 5.167
 Low-NFC 5.00
High-NFC 7.875
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Intelligence Ratings
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-informed ratings by accent type and NFC 
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